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WAS THERE AN ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE?
THE OPINION OF GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, QC.
THE ISSUE
There is no doubt that in 1915, the Ottoman government ordered the
deportation of up to two million Armenians from Anatolia and other
provinces: they were marched towards Syria and hundreds of thousands
died en route from disease, starvation, and armed attack. There were other
atrocities committed against Armenians in that year because of their race
and their Christian religion, beginning with the rounding up of several
hundred intellectuals in Constantinople on April 24th. The "Young Turk"
government was accused of responsibility for what the governments of
Britain, France, and Russia, jointly and formally declared to be a "crime
against humanity." These allies solemnly promised to punish the
perpetrators, and after the war, special provisions were made to do so in the
Treaty of S~vres.
The United Kingdom rounded up sixty-seven Turkish officials
suspected of ordering atrocities and held them for trial in Malta, but for
reasons of diplomatic expediency, they were eventually released. There
was, until the Nuremberg Charter in 1946, no international criminal law to
punish the political and military leaders of sovereign states for mass-murder
of their own citizens for religious or racial reasons. The destruction of a
substantial part of the Armenians in Turkey became, in the years before the
Holocaust, the paradigm for those who argued for the creation of a new
crime to be called genocide; this came to pass with the United Nation's
Genocide Convention of December 1948. Most genocide scholars and
historians, and many European parliaments, have described the fate of the
Armenians as "genocide," but recent British governments have, when asked
by members of parliament, resolutely refused to do so.
Pursuant to an application under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), the hitherto secret policy documents and memoranda in which
officials advised and drafted these refusals have been obtained from the
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Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). I am instructed by the Armenian
Centre to consider the attitude of the British government in refusing to
accept that the massacres of Armenians in 1915-16 amounted to genocide,
and whether its reasons for taking this position are valid and sustainable in
international law.
The invariable attitude of the British government over the past decade
whenever this issue is raised-whether in parliamentary debate, by way of
ministerial question, or in diplomatic exchanges-is to describe the events
of 1915 as "a tragedy" and to state "in the absence of unequivocal evidence
to show that the Ottoman Administration took a specific decision to
eliminate the Armenians under their control at the time, British
governments have not recognised the events of 1915 and 1916 as
'genocide.""
This formula was first enunciated by Baroness Ramsey, a government
spokesman in the House of Lords, at the conclusion of a debate on April
14 th, 1999. It was most recently echoed in February 2008 in the House of
Lords' written answer by Lord Malloch-Brown, when replying on behalf of
Her Majesty's Government (HMG) to the question of whether it would
recognise the existence of genocide in Armenia in 1915:
The position of the government on this issue is longstanding. The
government acknowledges the strength of feeling about this terrible
episode of history and recognises the massacres of 1915-1916 as a
tragedy. However, neither this government nor previous
governments have judged that the evidence is sufficiently
unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorised
as genocide, as defined by the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide.2
LEMKIN'S ANSWER
This answer would certainly have perplexed Raphael Lemkin, the legal
architect of the Genocide Convention, because the Armenian massacres
were uppermost in his mind when he coined the word-a hybrid of the
Greek geno (meaning "race" or "tribe") and the Latin cide (from caedere
i.e., "killing"). The massacres had pre-occupied him ever since he read
about the case of Soghomon Tehlirian, an Armenian whose family had been
killed in the massacres and who, in reprisal, assassinated Talaat Pasha, the
former Ottoman Interior Minister regarded as primarily responsible for
them. The evidence called on Tehlirian's behalf at his trial, in Germany in
1923, had convinced Lemkin that the purpose of the Turkish authorities in
deporting the Armenians was to destroy the race, but he was reluctant to
1. 599 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1999) 826.
2. 699 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2008) WA165.
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approve of the acquittal of a vigilante who had acted as the "self-appointed
legal office for the conscience of mankind."3 Lemkin studied the abortive
British proceedings against the "Young Turk" leaders in Malta and the
jurisdictional difficulties that had arisen. These difficulties arose from the
absence at the time of any international criminal law: there was no juristic
basis for prosecuting officials of a foreign government for organising the
deaths of their own nationals.
Lemkin's first paper on this subject, written for a conference in Madrid
in 1933, argued that the world needed a new law to prohibit the murderous
repression of racial and religious groups. He warned that this was
necessary in order to prevent the repetition, in other countries at other times,
of the Ottoman slaughter of the Armenians. Presciently, he drew attention
to Hitler's recent rise to power, but his first and subsequent drafts of this
new law were always referable to the fate of the Armenians: the evidence,
to his mind, was unequivocal. Lemkin's chief example of the kind of crime
that he wanted the world to outlaw remained, until the outbreak of war, the
Armenian massacres.
After the outbreak of war, Lemkin adopted Churchill's description of
the Nazi Holocaust ("we are in the presence of a crime without a name") as
his premise for urging the adoption of a new crime which in 1943 he named
"genocide." His penultimate example of genocide, as he lobbied throughout
the 1940s for the acceptance of a convention, was always the Armenians: he
began with the Maronites-he could have started with the citizens of
Carthage-then the Huguenots in France, the Protestants in Bohemia, the
Hottentots, and then the Armenians, followed finally by the Jewish, gypsy,
and Slavic victims of the Nazis.4 He pressed the case of the Armenians on
the Canadian ambassador, who introduced him to Dr. H. V. Evatt,
Australian Foreign Minister and President of the General Assembly who
took up the cause. It was assisted by reports (published as early as 1942) of
Hitler's infamous speech to his generals on the eve of their invasion of
Poland:
I have sent my Death's Head units to the East with the order to kill
without mercy men, women and children of the Polish race or
language. Only in such a way will we win the lebensraum that we
need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the
Armenians?5
Lemkin's lecturing to and lobbying of the delegates to the United
Nations (UN) legal sub-committee in Geneva during the drafting of the
3. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL 19 (Penguin 2002); see also George R.
Montgomery, Why Talaat"s Assassin was Acquitted, CURRENT HISTORY, July 5, 1921, at 551.
4. See POWER, supra note 3, at 54-5.
5. Louis P. LOCHNER, WHAT ABOUT GERMANY? 12 (Hodder & Stoughton 1943) (citing
notes of Admiral Canaris taken on Aug. 22, 1939).
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Genocide Convention leaves little doubt that the Preamble statement "that
at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity" 6
was intended to refer, inter alia, to that period in history, 1915-16, when
approximately half the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were
starved or slaughtered. Indeed, in the first case on the interpretation of the
Convention, the United States government submitted to the International
Court of Justice that "the Turkish massacres of Armenians" were one of the
"outstanding examples of the crime of genocide."7
HMG's POSITION AT THE TIME
HMG's current description of these events as no more than a "tragedy"
would have astonished the leaders of HMG in 1915 and during the post-war
peace conferences, who viewed them not as a tragedy but as a monumental
crime. A joint declaration by Britain, France, and Russia in May 1915
vowed that all members of the Ottoman government would be held
personally liable for what was, for the first time, described as a "crime
against humanity."8 Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, said that "the
massacres in Syria and Armenia are far more terrible than any that history
has recorded in those hapless countries,"9 and the government replied to
speeches in the House of Lords accusing the Turks of proceeding
"systematically to exterminate a whole race out of their domain"'" with the
promise that "when the day of reckoning arrives, the individuals who have
precipitated or taken part in these crimes will not be forgotten."" Lloyd
George, then Prime Minister, did not mince his words when recollecting his
view at the time:
By these atrocities, almost unparalleled in the black record of
Turkish rule, the Armenian population was reduced in numbers by
well over one million .... If we succeeded in defeating this
inhuman empire, one essential condition of the peace we should
impose was the redemption of the Armenian valleys forever from
the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the
infamies of the Turk. 2
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter the Genocide Convention].
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2d ed. Cambridge 2009)
(2000).
8. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 35 (1948) (describing the joint declaration of
France, Great Britain, and Russia on May 28, 1915).
9. TANER AKCAM, A SHAMEFUL ACT 213 (Holt 2006).
10. FO 371/2488/172811, Nov. 17, 1915 (on file with author).
11. FO 371/2488/148483, Oct. 6, 1915 (on file with author).
12. LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 811-12 (Yale University Press,
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As Winston Churchill, himself no mean historian, saw it: "In 1915 the
Turkish government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general
massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor .... There is no
reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and executed for political
reasons."13 "Whole districts were blotted out in one administrative
holocaust."14
At the Paris Peace Conference, Britain demanded the indictment of the
Turkish leaders responsible for the Armenian massacres. A Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War was established in January
1919, and it recommended the prosecution of the Turkish leaders for war
crimes committed against their own citizens on their own sovereign
territory because these were an example of "primitive barbarism"
implemented by a "terrorist system." In the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies
reserved the right to bring suspected war criminals to trial. Article 230 of
the Treaty of S~vres proclaimed:
The Turkish government undertakes to hand over to the Allied
powers the persons whose surrender may be required as being
responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of
the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish
Empire. The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to
designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and
the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. 5
Under Article 228, the Turkish government undertook to furnish all
documents, the production of which might be "considered necessary to
ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the prosecution of
offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility."' 6 Although France
and Italy soon tired of this novel commitment to international justice and
recognised the advantage of friendly relations with the new Turkey under
Ataturk, Britain maintained its promise to bring the authors of the atrocities
to justice. Not content with the domestic trials of the young Turk leaders
that had been held in Constantinople, Britain brought sixty-seven of them to
Malta-which was under colonial governance-to face trial. But the
jurisdictional difficulties of prosecuting foreign officials for killing their
own people concerned Balfour. In December 1918, he told an Allied
conference that the perpetrators of the Armenian massacres,
strictly speaking had committed no definite legal offences.... It
was necessary to consider how they could be got at. Talaat had said
1939).
13. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS: THE AFTERMATH 405 (1929).
14. Id. at 175.
15. See Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, in MARTIN LAWRENCE, THE TREATIES OF PEACE
971 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2007) (1924).
16. Id.
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that Armenians were a constant trouble. He had made up his mind
to get rid of them, and, in consequence, he had massacred them en
masse. That was merely the policy, and the offenders could not be
tried by court martial, as they had committed no definite legal
offence. 17
Eventually, this noble first stab at international justice petered out, and the
Turkish suspects detained in Malta were exchanged for British prisoners
who were being held in Constantinople virtually as hostages. 8 It is true that
there had been problems with collecting evidence against individuals-the
Turkish cooperation demanded by the Treaty of S~vres had not been
forthcoming, and the investigators lacked access to the Ottoman archives.
In due course, Ataturk's victory over the Greeks forced the Allies to
abandon all the penal clauses of Svres in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.19
But as Balfour's speech demonstrates, no difficulty was apprehended in
proving the fact of the massacres or that they were racially motivated. So
the question now to be asked is whether, irrespective of individual
culpability, the massacres themselves fulfilled the criteria for genocide laid
down in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, and whether a state, as distinct from an individual defendant, can
be liable for the crime.
THE LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
Article I of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide simply states that "genocide, whether committed in time of peace
or time of war, is a crime under international law."2 This treaty has been
ratified by so many states that it is now considered jus cogens, a rule of
modem customary international law binding on all states (whether they
have ratified the convention or not) and requiring them to prosecute acts of
17. GARRY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 131 (2000) (quoting CAB 28/5 I.C.-99,
Inter-Allied Conference, London, Dec. 2, 1918).
18. Id. at 142 (citing FO 371/6504/E10411, Sept. 16, 1921). The FCO advised, "[i]t is in a
measure yielding to blackmail, but seems justified by present conditions."
19. Ataturk admitted the massacres were a "shameful act"; but denied Turkish responsibility
on the basis they were unauthorised-the position Turkey enforces today, by prosecuting under
s.301 of its Penal Code, those who allege genocide. The Treaty of Lausanne featured a
"Declaration of Amnesty" for all offences committed between August 1, 1914 and November 20,
1922, although such blanket amnesties would not now be recognised in international law. See
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-128-73747, Decision on Lack of
Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lom6 Accord, (Robertson, J.,separate
opinion) (May 25, 2004); see also GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 296-
312 (Penguin 3d ed. 2006).
20. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. I.
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genocide. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained in its
decision in the Reservations to the Convention of Genocide Case, "the
origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the UN to
condemn and punish genocide as a 'crime under international law'
involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial
which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to
humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the
United Nations. 21
Article II of the Convention lays down that:
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within that group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 22
The legal concept of genocide is not fully understood by those historians
and FCO officials who have declined to apply it to the Armenian massacres.
This crime, like all other serious crimes, has a factual element (actus reus)
and a mental element (mens rea). The actus involves the causation of harm,
physical or mental, to members of a group, targeted by discrimination on
national, ethnic, or religious grounds. Importantly, it includes "deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or part," and this Article 11(c) may well have
been drafted with the fate of the Armenians in mind. The Ottoman
government had ordered their deportation under conditions that were known
to expose them to disease, starvation, and lethal attack by "Special
Organisation" (Teshkilat-i Mahsusa) paramilitaries and marauding Kurds.
As the leading legal textbook on genocide notes:
The treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish rulers in 1915
provides the paradigm for the provision dealing with imposition of
conditions of life. These crimes have often been described as
"deportations." But they went far beyond mere expulsion or
transfer, because the deportation itself involved deprivation of
fundamental human needs with the result that large numbers died of
21. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 23 (May 28).
22. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. HI.
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disease, malnutrition and exhaustion. 13
PARTIAL DESTRUCTION OF GROUP MEMBERS
The object does not have to be the extermination of the entire group: a
part of it will suffice, even a small part, defined geographically. For
example, the ICJ has held that genocide was not committed generally in
Bosnia, other than at Srebrenica, by the killing of 7,000 men and boys and
the deportation of 25,000 women and children who resided in that area. 4
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
examined the requirement that there must be an intention to destroy a group
"in whole or in part" in the case of Krstic, and concluded that the intent to
eradicate a group within a limited geographical area, such as a region of a
country or even a municipality, could be characterised as genocide.25 As
Schabas notes:
... destroying all members of a group within a continent, or a
country, or an administrative region or even a town, might satisfy
the "in part" requirement of Article II. The Turkish government
targeted Armenians within its borders, not those of the diaspora. 6
What is required is that the "part" should be an identifiable part or else a
significant part of the whole. For example, the ICTY in its Bosnia v. Serbia
decision considered that a "substantial" part must be targeted. There is no
doubt that all the Armenians in the eastern provinces, including Anatolia
(about 1.5 million) were targeted by the deportations and about 800,000
were killed (estimates have ranged from 600,000 to 1.2 million deaths). On
any view, whichever estimate is chosen, this is a substantial proportion of
the Armenians (about 2 million in all), and of course hundreds of thousands
more were physically and/or psychologically damaged. There is a good deal
of evidence that Armenians were targeted as such, i.e., as a racial group,
and not merely because they were Christians. 7
In the case of Akayesu, before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the Trial Chamber held that the phrase "deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part" included subjecting a group of
people to "systematic expulsion from homes. '28 The deportation orders to
23. SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 192-93.
24. The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter The Genocide
Case].
25. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 589 (Aug. 2, 2001).
26. SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 285.
27. See DONALD BLOXHAM, THE GREAT GAME OF GENOCIDE 93-4 (2005). For example,
when Dr. Reshid, provincial governor in Diyarbakir, began killing all the Christians he could
apprehend, he was informed by the Interior Ministry to restrict his attentions to Armenians.
28. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 1 505-06 (Sept. 2, 1998)
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which the Armenians were subjected in 1915 fall within this category. In
the case of Kayishema and Ruzindana, it was held that this category also
includes the deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival,
such as food or medical services.29 This was a feature of the 1915
deportation, and is accepted by pro-Turkish historians. The ICTY has ruled
that the definition also covers the creation of circumstances that lead to a
slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene, or excessive
work or physical exhaustion-another feature of the 1915 "death
marches."30
Article III of the Convention extends the definition of genocide to
"conspiracy" (an agreement to participate in a genocidal act), "incitement"
to commit genocide (a crime committed, e.g., by radio broadcasts in
Rwanda: "the grave is only half full-who will help us fill it?") and
"complicity" in genocide-a concept that involves not only aiding and
abetting but being an "accessory after the fact," i.e., helping to cover it up
or taking its benefits. The ICJ found that Serbia had breached its obligations
under the Convention by failing to prevent the Srebrenica massacres and by
failing to prosecute those responsible for the genocide.3
Under Article IV of the Convention, there is no immunity for genocide:
it covers "constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals." This is an important article, because pro-Turkish historians
and the FCO seem to think that genocide can only be carried out as a matter
of state policy, and demand "unequivocal" documentary evidence of a
government decision. This is not a necessary element of the crime.
GENOCIDAL INTENT
The Genocide Convention stipulates that the crime of genocide requires
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group. In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that the
commission of genocide requires proof of "special intent," meaning the
perpetrator clearly sought to bring about the act charged as a crime. The
Trial Chamber noted that in the absence of a confession, it is difficult to
prove this intention, and consequently ruled that the necessary intention
could be inferred from a number of other factors.32 For example, the intent
can be inferred from words, or deeds, or by a pattern of purposeful action.33
[hereinafter Akayesul.
29. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 115 (May
21, 1999) (referring the the First Draft of the Genocide Convention art. I(H)(1)(b), U.N. Doc.
E/447) [hereinafter Ruzindana].
30. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 691 (Sept. 1, 2004).
31. The Genocide Case, supra note 24.
32. Akayesu, supra note 28, at 523.
33. Ruzindana, supra note 29, at 93.
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The intent can also be inferred from the general context in which other
culpable acts were committed systematically against the same group,
regardless of whether such acts were committed by the same perpetrator or
by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their
general nature, whether committed in a region or a country, or the fact of
deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups, can also enable the inference of genocidal intent to be drawn. 4
In the case of Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber inferred that the
accused had the necessary intent from the speeches he had made and the
deliberate and systematic atrocities committed against the Tutsis 5
Similarly, in the case of Musema, the ICTR Trial Chamber inferred the
necessary intent to destroy the Tutsis from the numerous atrocities
committed against them, the large scale attacks against the Tutsi civilians,
and from the widespread and systematic perpetration of other criminal acts
against members of the Tutsi group. 6 These elements were present during
the Armenian deportations. The case law of the ICTR and ICTY does not
appear, from the documents disclosed, to have been drawn to the FCO's
attention.
The mental element (mens rea) is often difficult to prove against public
officials (who destroy incriminating records) and against private
individuals, who must be proved to have a "discriminatory intent," i.e., to
be acting out of a conscious determination to participate in a programme
which aims to destroy the group as such, in whole or part. Rarely will such
a heinous intention be spelled out in any document; it must be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. There will be little difficulty in proving mass
murder, often from photographic evidence or the opening of mass graves.
The discriminatory intent to destroy can be deduced from a range of
evidence that demonstrates malice aforethought towards the group. Usually
there will be some history of its persecution, and the persecutors will
themselves be in the grip of nationalist fervour which boasts their own
racial supremacy and demeans the victim group (e.g., the "Turkification"
programme of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) which was
designed to eliminate rival ethnic identities, especially those of the
Armenians and the Kurds). Other familiar indicia of genocidal intent are
attacks which single out the intelligentsia or cultural leadership of the
victim group (such as the arrests, deportations, and subsequent killings of
several hundred Armenian intellectuals, lawyers, writers, and cultural
34. Akayesu, supra note 28, at 523.
35. Id. at 729-30.
36. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 143 (Oxford 2d ed. 2008)
(2003).
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figures in Constantinople on and immediately after April 24, 1915)" 7 and
attacks on the groups' religious and cultural symbols.
It is evident from the policy memoranda that the FCO and the pro-
Turkish historians it has cited think that the crime of genocide requires a
government policy or the collective activity of a state. However, the Appeal
Chamber of the ICTY held in the case of Jelisic that "the existence of a plan
or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime"38 To the extent that
"deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part" involves some kind of
order that amounts to an "infliction," the Interior Minister's orders for
deportation of Armenians is an obvious example. Collective or organised
action may follow as when others pursue a common plan, e.g., to rob or
rape or murder the deportees. However, this does not need to be a
government policy: it can be conduct which has the acquiescence of the
authorities.39 There is no doubt that in 1915, the Ottoman government
willingly acquiesced and even continued the deportations in the knowledge
that many of the deportees would die.
There is no dispute that the Ottoman government was responsible for
"ethnic cleansing" by ordering the Armenians removed to Syria, although
this does not amount to genocide unless it was accompanied by the
infliction of conditions of life calculated to destroy the group. It would, of
course, amount to a crime against humanity. The ICJ, in its Bosnia v. Serbia
decision,4" cautioned that ethnic cleansing will in some circumstances
constitute genocide, but is not necessarily or always carried out with a
destructive intent. Whether or not it does amount to genocide will depend
on whether those who order the deportations and those who carry out the
orders are aware that the manner and circumstances of the deportations
would inevitably involve physical or mental destruction of whole or part of
the group. Even if mass deportation orders were in some cases accompanied
by instructions that deportees should be well looked after, and their homes
locked up to await their eventual return, it would be unrealistic to suggest,
in the circumstances of the Armenian deportations, that those involved at
ministerial, departmental, and local levels did not have foreknowledge of
the lethal consequences of their policy. In any event, they were well aware,
throughout the time when the deportations were underway, that the
deportations had turned into death marches. The Armenians were dying in
the tens of thousands, and those who put them in these conditions did
nothing to extract them or bring the conditions to an end by, for example,
protecting the deportees or punishing those who attacked them.
37. See PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TiGRIS 212-16 (Heinenmann 2003) (2002).
38. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 48 (July 5, 2001).
39. See CASSESE, supra note 36, at 141.
40. The Genocide Case, supra note 24, at 190.
No. 21
94 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IV
There is ample evidence that the Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) leadership knew of these massacres. The U.S. ambassador, Henry
Morgenthau, complained several times to Interior Minister Talaat Pasha
about his government's "extermination" policy, and he quotes Talaat as
replying, "[w]e have already disposed of three quarters of the Armenians;
there are none left in Bitlis, Van and Erzerum. The hatred between the
Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with
them. If we don't, they will plan their revenge."41 In a modem war crimes
trial, the ambassador's testimony would be relied upon as evidence of an
admission by Talaat to the knowledge (mens rea) sufficient for guilt of
genocide under the command responsibility principle.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The issue here is not whether any particular "Young Turk" leader or
official was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of this crime. HMG has been
regularly asked whether the Ottoman state committed genocide, and its
reply that the "evidence is not sufficiently unequivocal" seems to assume
that an individual is on trial and that the state, as such, cannot commit the
crime. This was Serbia's argument before the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia. The
court rejected it, holding that all states have an obligation, under Article I of
the Convention, to prevent genocide and that obligation implies that states
as well as persons are prohibited from committing the crime." The state
will be responsible if it has "effective control" over those who carried out
the genocidal acts,43 although a lesser standard, that of "overall control," has
been preferred in war crimes courts." The Ottoman government was
certainly in "overall control" of Anatolia in 1915 and of those who carried
out the atrocities there. That control was effective enough in most (if not
all) of the areas where the killings took place to shepherd streams of
Turkish refugees from the Balkans flowing the other way, into Anatolia,
and some of these dmigrds were to occupy the houses forcibly vacated by
the Armenians.
Under the draft laws of state responsibility, the liability of the state for
41. BALKIAN, supra note 37, at 274; see also HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR
MORGENTHAU'S STORY 333-38, 342 (Doubleday 1918).
42. The Genocide Case, supra note 23, at 142-79.
43. Id. at 399-407.
44. Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, Appeal Judgment, 1 131 (July 15, 1999). The
court says,
[i]n order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be
proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its
military activity. Only then can the State be held internationally accountable for any
misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in addition, the State should
also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.
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genocide may be engaged:
(i) if the orders are given and implemented by de jure organs of
the state, i.e., by ministers or government officials, police or
regular army officers;
(ii) if the killings are done by defacto organs of the state-namely
irregular bodies (such as the "Special Organisation"), death
squads and paramilitaries connected with the state agencies; or
(iii) by persons or bodies acting under orders of state organs in a
particular set of circumstances.45
Applying these tests, the ICJ held--on the evidence before it, which many
allege was incomplete-that although there had been genocide in
Srebrenica committed by the army of Republica Serpska, neither that
government nor its army were effectively controlled by Serbia, so its
international responsibility was not engaged. As we shall see, there is no
doubt that deportation orders which were known to inflict conditions of life
calculated to bring about the destruction of a substantial part of the
Armenian people were given by dejure organs of the state such as ministers
and government officials, and that the massacres involved both dejure and
defacto agents of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the state was well aware
of historical animosities prone to break out in mass murder of the Armenian
minorities (i.e., in 1894-96 and 1909) and had deliberately stirred up that
animosity through its Turkification programme. The officials who ordered
the deportations must have known of the likely consequences, yet took no
steps to avoid them or to put safeguards in place. In such circumstances,
where killings are being carried out by criminal gangs with the knowledge
and acquiescence of authorities who could (but do not) act to prevent them,
"command responsibility" principles make the authorities themselves
responsible for murders by criminal gangs which they foresee yet fail to
prevent or subsequently to punish.46
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Before moving on to consider whether the indisputable facts of the
Armenian deportations and massacres can be properly described as
genocide, it should be understood that, on any view, they constitute a crime
against humanity. This appellation was applied by the allies in 1915 more
as rhetoric than as a legal description, because international law had not, at
the time, developed a criminal jurisdiction. Today, this category of crime is
authoritatively defined by Article VII of the Statute of the International
45. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Shabtai Rosenne ed. 1991).
46. Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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Criminal Court. 7 Article VII covers deportation of, or forcible transfer of,
population (i.e., "forced displacement by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present") and persecution (the
"intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights by reason of the
identity of the group" when such group or collectivity is identifiable "on
racial, national, ethnic, cultural (or) religious grounds.. ."). The deportation
or persecution amounts to a crime against humanity when the perpetrator is
aware that it is part of a "widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population." It is beyond reasonable doubt that the deportations
of the Armenian population of Turkey's western provinces, under
conditions known to be life threatening, amounted to what would now be
accurately described as a crime against humanity. Does it therefore matter if
it also answers to the description of genocide? There is a considerable
overlap between the two international crimes. All genocides are crimes
against humanity, but not all crimes against humanity amount to genocide.
The distinction rests upon whether the perpetrator has the necessary racist
or discriminatory intention to destroy the group in whole or in part. It is this
element which makes genocide so heinous, and attaches duties and
penalties in international law that are more severe and better established
than those attaching to crimes against humanity. To this extent, the issue
addressed in this opinion retains an importance that is not just symbolic.
CAN THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES BE DESCRIBED
AS GENOCIDE?
THE RETROACTIVE ISSUE
I do not consider the Genocide Convention to be retroactive, and I do
not accept the view of those legal scholars who believe the Genocide
Convention can be applied retroactively because it was declaratory of pre-
existing international law.48 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties49 sets up a presumption that treaties are not retroactive. This
presumption is all the stronger in relation to a criminal offence, and I find
nothing to rebut this presumption in the language of the Genocide
Convention. Plainly, the term "genocide" may be applied to massacres
before the passage of the Convention. Those who drafted and debated it
spoke repeatedly of other historical events as "genocide" even though they
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC, art. VII, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
48. See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, Memoranda on the Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-
1923 and the Application of the 1948 Genocide Convention, EUR. ARMENIAN FED'N FOR JUST.
AND DEMOCRACY (on file with author), available at http://eafjd.euIIMG/pdfldezayasreport.pdf.
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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had occurred centuries before. Early examples include the decimation of the
Spartans and the destruction of the citizens of Carthage. The Preamble
statement, which recognises that "at all periods of history genocide has
inflicted great losses on humanity," is sufficient warrant for applying the
label to pre-Convention events that satisfy its definition.
THE BUILD-UP TO GENOCIDE
The Ottoman Empire included about two million Armenians, mainly
living in the eastern provinces of the Empire. They were tolerated, without
sharing military or political power, until the Empire became "the sick man
of Europe" towards the end of the nineteenth century, during the repressive
rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (condemned by Prime Minister Gladstone as
"the great assassin" for his role in the massacres of the Armenians in the
1890s). Abdul Hamid II bears some responsibility for whipping up pan-
Islamic passions (he described Armenians as "a degenerate community")."
The first mass murders took place in 1894-96, committed by Ottoman
forces assisted by local Kurds. Tens of thousands of Armenians (some
estimates put the casualties in six figures) were killed in this period (1,200
were burnt alive in Urfa cathedral). Their Christian churches were pillaged
and many were forcibly converted to Islam. At the same time, several
Armenian revolutionary movements emerged, most notably the Dashnak
Party, advocating a separate state and forcible resistance to achieve it.
However, there is ample evidence that the 1894-96 violence was motivated
by racial and religious hatreds encouraged by the Ottoman government,
exacerbated by pockets of armed Armenian resistance. This was certainly
the view of the British Ambassador and his vice-consuls at the time, who
protested to the Ottoman authorities and left the British government in no
doubt about their culpability.5 There was another massacre of about 25,000
Armenians in Adana in 1909, committed mainly by army units: this time it
was denounced by the then government, but few were punished. These
massacres emphasised the depths of the racial and religious hatreds that
existed in the country, and that any government had a duty not to unleash
them again.
Meanwhile, the "Young Turk" movement was growing in power
through the CUP. At first politically progressive, the CUP nonetheless
developed the kind of race supremacy theories that are particularly
associated with a build-up to genocide. For example, the CUP adopted the
racist idea that Turanian nationality was a badge of superiority, to the
50. See Michael Oren, The Mass Murder They Still Deny, 53 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 8
(2007) (reviewing AKcAM, supra note 9).
51. BALAKIAN, supra note 37, at 55-61 (describing how British missionaries identified anti-
Christian motivations in the massacres).
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exclusion of non-Muslims and especially Christians; public subhumanising
of minority groups like Armenians ("tubercular microbes"); extreme
nationalist fervour, demanding a "warrior nation" to prevent "the decay of
the Turkish race"; a "Turkification" programme for language and culture;
the banning of Armenian organisations. With the coup d'gtat of January 23,
1913, the Young Turks gained a share in government. At the beginning of
1914, their three leaders assumed political control. They set up the "Special
Organisation" attached to Talaat's Interior Ministry, which targeted
members of minority races whose loyalty was suspect. The British
Ambassador noted at this time the emergence of a violent "Turkey for the
Turks" campaign: "For [the Young Turks] 'Ottoman' evidently means
'Turk' and their present policy of 'Ottomanisation' is one of pounding the
non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar."52 The most powerful Young
Turk politicians-Talaat, Cemal, and Enver Pashas-occupied high offices
and formulated policy through the Central Committee of the CUP. Their
strident nationalism took Turkey into the First World War on the side of
Germany. There can be no doubt of the "Turkification" campaign or of the
race hate it stirred against Armenians. Government decrees deprived
Armenians of their property, deeming it abandoned, and directed banks to
transfer Armenian assets to "liquidation commissions" established by the
state. 3 Telegram directives from Enver Pasha ordered that villages, rivers,
and towns that had been taken over by Muslims should be renamed if they
bore Christian or Armenian names. 4
There is considerable evidence from 1914 onward that the CUP
Congress developed a "Turkification" rhetoric that paved the way for
genocide. Taner Ak9am, for example, argues that after Enver's appointment
as Minister of Defence in January 1914, a series of secret meetings were
held to discuss the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia. In November, war fever
resulted in a declaration ofjihad (holy war) against Christians (although the
Germans and Austro-Hungarians, were exempted as the government's
allies).5 Talaat and Cemal threatened reprisals against Armenians if
Muslims were killed by Allied naval bombardment. In February 1915,
Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army were disarmed and transferred to
52. BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL-A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND
EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 405 (2007).
53. On Jan.l, 1916, the Minister of Commerce directed banks to transfer Armenian assets-
land, bank deposits, etc.-to state commissions. These confiscation decrees were acts of the
Ottoman government. See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (C.D. Cal.
2007). These decrees are inconsistent with the Turkish claims that the deportations were merely
temporary.
54. See Taner Akqam, Demographic Policy and Ethnic Cleansing (March 4, 2008) (on file
with author).
55. Thisjihad which Morgenthau claimed began the passions that led to the massacres, was
declared by the chief religious authority, a recent CUP appointee. See BALAKIAN, supra note 37,
at 169.
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labour battalions.56 Plans were made for re-settlement of areas "cleansed"
of Armenians, and the "Special Organisation" was geared up to carry out
work which could not be publicly linked to the government.57
THE DEPORTATIONS AND MASSACRES
The facts of the massacres are not in doubt. Whether, as some historians
claim, an extermination programme was agreed upon at a secret CUP
conference in January 1915 does not matter: there must have been political
planning behind the government's deportation orders, which commenced in
April 1915. On April 24, the night before the Allied landings at Gallipoli,
several hundred Armenian intellectuals were arrested in Constantinople and
sent for deportation, and some were lynched. In May, Talaat ordered the
deportations from Anatolia, and this was followed by deportations of other
Armenian groups throughout Eastern Turkey. A few local officials refused
to carry out the orders-an indication that some government agents realised
their deadly consequences. 8 The homes and property of Armenians were
pillaged or seized. Little or no food was made available to those ordered to
march through the desert or forced aboard packed trains, and tens of
thousands were to die from starvation and disease. There was no security,
and columns of people were set upon, their members robbed, raped,
abducted, or killed by Kurdish brigands, by paramilitaries, and by police
under the control of party officials or local governors. There were no safe
havens already prepared to receive them. The Harbord Report, a credible
United States' fact-finding mission in 1919, concluded that "[t]he women,
old men and children were after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha
called 'agricultural colonies,' from the high cool breezeswept plateau of
Armenia to the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of
Syria and Arabia."59 Hundreds of thousands were killed on these marches
because they were Armenians and because they had been deliberately
ordered to suffer "conditions of life calculated to bring about their
destruction in whole or in part"-a very substantial part on any calculation.
Talaat's orders, it is reliably reported, were to bring the Armenian problem
to "a final end, in a comprehensive and absolute way."'6 Many thousands of
women were abducted or acquiesced in conversion to Islam in order to save
56. DONALD BLOXHAM, THE GREAT GAME OF GENOCIDE 70-71 (2005).
57. See AKCAM, supra note 9, at 182.
58. These are credible reports that a few officials who refused to comply were punished.
59. MAJOR GENERAL JAMES HARBORD, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO
ARMENIA, S. Doc. No. 66-2, at 7 (2d Sess. 1920).
60. See Oren, supra note 50. Morgenthau cites telegrams from Talaat ordering orphanages to
reject Armenian children whose parents died on the marches because "the government ...
considers the survival of these children as detrimental." See also Michael J. Kelly, Genocide-The
Power of a Label, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.,151, 151-52 (2008).
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their lives or the lives of their children.6 Forcible religious conversion is
another indicium of genocide.
The realities of the massacres demonstrate the extent to which racial
hatred was whipped up by the ideology of "Turkification." There are reports
of whole communities being liquidated by means including mass burnings,
drownings, and asphyxiation at desert camps. Many Armenian men had
been conscripted, and in February 1915, they were taken out of Ottoman
army units and consigned to labour camps. Old men, children, and women
were the vulnerable victims of the marches through the desert. Some young
women and children were able to survive by offering themselves as brides
or chattels whilst others were spared by converting to Islam. There is
evidence that some children were forcibly removed and placed with Muslim
families-a breach of Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention. Out of an
Armenian population of two million, between 800,000 and one million
were directly or indirectly killed from 1915-16.62 The latest factual
summary, published in 2009 by British historian Cathie Carmichael, is as
follows:
Deportations from different locations, initiated by government
telegrams involved the rounding up and killing of some Armenians
on the spot. Many were also subjected to the wrath of their
neighbours and put on the open road with no protection. Although
they were nominally "deported", most of the Armenians died of
exposure, disease, starvation or violent attack, either from
gendarmes or from bands of Kurds in the mountains. In the Black
Sea port of Trebizond, the local community was taken out to sea
and drowned. Many women were violated and murdered in front of
their families. At least two-thirds of the 'deportees' did not survive
this treatment; those few who did eked out a precarious existence in
refugee camps in Syria or in Russian controlled areas .... Within a
few weeks, an entire community had effectively been destroyed
forever. About one million Armenians died, approximately half of
the prewar population, but their community was never
reconstructed within Anatolia itself .... The deportations and
massacres had effectively used violence to solve what European
diplomats had been calling 'the Armenian question' for decades. As
Donald Bloxham has argued the massacres 'enabled the Committee
of Union and Progress to secure Anatolia as an ethnically "purified"
core area for the development for the Turkish people.'63
61. BALAKIAN, supra note 37, at 180.
62. MARK LEVENE, GENOCIDE IN THE AGE OF THE NATION STATE: THE MEANING OF
GENOCIDE 73 (l.B.Tauris 2008) (2005).
63. CATHIE CARMICHAEL, GENOCIDE BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST 1 8-9 (2009).
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JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE?
The CUP defended its deportation policy at the time (as the government
of Turkey does today) as necessary for the country's self-defence: it was
justified in removing "fifth columnists" at the moment of the Dardanelles
invasion at Gallipoli and threats on its Eastern border, where the Armenian
population posed a real risk of linking up with a Russian invasion-and that
risk was demonstrated by an uprising of Armenians in Van on April 20th.
However, notwithstanding the existence of pockets of armed Armenian
resistance, this was hardly a justification for ordering the deportation of an
entire population. As one recent study concludes:
Overall, there is little evidence of a general Armenian threat in the
eastern region .... Armenian religious and political leaders in
1914-15 were actually preaching loyalty and placidity as well as
encouraging young men to fulfil their Ottoman army obligations.
Moreover, the vast majority of Armenians remained unpoliticised.
What Armenian resistance there was appears to have been
localised, desperate and reactive in the face of liquidation.'
One moderate historian sympathetic to the Turks and an advocate for
"avoiding the g-word" observed in 2009 that:
Relentlessly monitored, intermittently terrorised, the vast majority
of Armenians, even in the politically literate towns, were in no state
to launch a rebellion. For most poor farmers, deportation was a
death sentence, and there is no doubt that deportation orders came,
for village after village, fromh central government, implemented by
local officials who knew that the hastily assembled convoys would
be subjected to pillage, rape and massacre from local paramilitaries,
robbers and police. Many killings were motivated by opportunistic
greed or lust, but they would not have taken place without a rooted
ethnic hatred towards Armenians, or the religious hatred
encapsulated in the cry of "God is Great" which accompanied many
of the killings.65
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to discount the perception of the Turkish
leaders that the Armenian population was a threat-a fifth column that
could ally itself with Russia in the event of an invasion. When the Tsarist
forces advanced into Eastern Anatolia later in 1915, its Armenian brigade
exacted brutal revenge on local Kurds and Turks, and at the war's end, after
the tide had turned, there is ample evidence of Armenian atrocities. It is
reasonable to criticise Armenian historians like Vahakn Dadrian for
glossing over these unpalatable facts,66 but they do not, viewed in
64. Id.
65. CHRISTOPHE DE BELLAIGUE, REBEL LAND 79 (2009).
66. Id. at 106. (noting the oddity that Dadrian should skip the subject in his exhaustive
No. 2]
102 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IV
perspective, alter the characterisation of Turkish actions as genocide. They
do not excuse or extenuate, much less justify, a policy that aimed to rid the
nation of a racial minority. The crime was introduced precisely to deter the
formation of a policy to persecute minorities in times of threat and national
emergency, when minorities which have been discriminated against are for
that reason likely to side with an invader, perceived as their liberator. This
danger may justify their temporary removal from border areas, or the
internment of their political leaders, but it cannot begin to excuse what the
Harbord Report to the United States' government in 1919 described as "this
wholesale attempt on the race."67
THE EVIDENCE
There are hundreds of contemporary accounts of these appalling events.
Many were by eyewitnesses: journalists, notably from The New York Times,
German bankers, missionaries (including German Christian missionaries),
aid organisers and consular officials (especially United States' vice-consuls,
reporting as anxious neutrals and German officials reporting as anxious
allies). Some of the most telling accounts, which attest to the genocidal
intentions of Talaat and other high political figures, were written in
dispatches or subsequent books by Western diplomats. The American
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau (whose cables alerted Washington to the
"race extinction" by "terrible tortures, expulsions, and massacres") on
several occasions interceded with Talaat, only to be told to "let us do with
these Christians as we please." He had no doubt that what he described as
"this attempt to exterminate a race" was not a response to fanatical popular
demands, but was a policy "directed from Constantinople."6
German diplomats had no motive to lie when reporting on the
behaviour of an ally, and the German Ambassador to Istanbul, Count
Wolff-Metternich, reported to Berlin that "the CUP demands the extirpation
of the last remnants of Armenians .... Turkification means licence to
expel, to kill or destroy everything that is not Turkish, and to violently take
possession of the goods of others."69 The German Vice-Consul in Erzurum
reported that the cruelty of CUP measures would mean "the certain death"
of the Armenian deportees. He said that the CUP "are bluntly admitting that
the purpose of their actions is the total obliteration of the Armenians. As an
authoritative person word-for-word declared, 'we will have in Turkey no
more Armenians after the war."' 7 United States' Vice-Consul Lesley
History of the Armenian Genocide).
67. BALAKIAN, supra note 37, at 357.
68. POWER, supra note 6, at 6-8.
69. KIERNAN, supra note 52, at 412.
70. BALAKIAN, supra note 37, at 186 (citing German archives at Auswartiges Amt (West
Germany's Foreign Office Archives) K170, no. (4674), folio 63).
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Davis, an experienced lawyer, had no doubt in his cables in 1915 and his
subsequent autobiography, The Slaughterhouse Province, that the
government was bent on destroying the Armenian race along with
repositories of its culture.71 Jesse K. Jackson, the hardened United States'
diplomat who served as consul in Aleppo, 1915-16, described in his
despatches the local towns and districts "where Armenians have already
been practically exterminated" and called the Turkish government's
confiscation scheme "a gigantic plundering scheme as well as a final blow
to extinguish the [Armenian] race."72
There are many corroborative statements from Christian missionaries
and aid workers, not to mention the books and other writings and
correspondence of survivors. Common to most of these first person
accounts is a depiction of a race hate element in the killings, the beatings,
and the rapes. Sometimes the race hatred emanated from officials,
sometimes from attackers who were connected with the army or the
"Special Organisation," and from the marauding Kurds. There can be no
doubt, from all these sources, that there was a systematic pattern of racial
attacks on vulnerable and starving columns of displaced Armenian men,
women, and children as they trudged through the Eastern Provinces towards
Syria. This result could and should have been foreseen. In any event, it took
place over a number of months without any official intervention to stop the
killings or to protect the deportees or to punish the perpetrators.
Punishment was attempted after the Young Turks lost power in October
1918. The current Sultan described the CUP persecution of the Armenians
as "[c]rimes against the laws of humanity and state" and a military tribunal
indicted them specifically for the crimes of "deportation and massacre." It
found many of them guilty. Although Talaat, Cemal, and Enver Pashas had
escaped to Germany by this time, they were convicted in absentia. The new
government may have established this court in the hope of pleasing the
victor nations, but there is no suggestion that its judges were not
independent or that the procedures they employed were unusual or unfair by
local standards. Their conclusions on the evidence were chilling, describing
in one case how the CUP secretary and a local governor organised "the
massacre and annihilation of the Armenians" by employing criminals
released from prison to act as their guards, but with directions to kill the
men and to drown the children. Tellingly, the court concluded that the CUP
measures had the characteristics of a "final solution." Statements attributed
to Talaat and other CUP leaders in despatches by foreign diplomats
suggests that this sort of language was often used by political leaders who
must have realised by mid-1915 that their deportations would become death
71. LESLIE DAVIS, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE PROVINCE: AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT'S REPORT
ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 1915-1917 (Susan K. Blair ed. 1989).
72. BALAKIAN, supra note 37, at 188, 257.
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marches.
Any objective analyst must be struck by the number and consistency of
these reports: they plainly describe incidents of genocide. The Turkish
government and pro-Turkish historians have sought to undermine some of
these accounts. For example, the Blue Book, which has a preface by Lord
James Bryce and is edited by Arnold J. Toynbee, is called into question by
Bryce's record as a propagandist,73 who has been accused of exaggerating
or inventing German atrocities in Belgium. I have, therefore, placed no
reliance upon it as a source.74 But the sheer weight of evidence and the
consistency of witness accounts, including those by respectable people who
could have no axe to grind or reason to fabricate (the German missionaries
and diplomats, for example, whose country was in alliance with Turkey and
the neutral US vice-consuls like Davis and Jackson) puts beyond doubt the
suggestion that there has been some anti-Turkish conspiracy to suppress the
truth. As for all the Armenian accounts, whilst some may be exaggerated,
they do collectively have a ring of truth: as one historian comments, "[flor
the Armenian diaspora, flung around the world, speaking different
languages, it would require a stupendous concert of deceit to fabricate the
descriptions of massacres, and to dream up reminiscences. Such a
conspiracy would be without precedent."75
The trials and verdicts in 1919 cannot be shrugged aside as having been
staged to please the allies: these were genuine proceedings carried out
according to Turkish law, which, although deficient by our standards
(particularly in permitting trials in absentia), were nonetheless legitimate
73. See PHILIP KNIGHTLY, THE FIRST CASUALTY 83-84 (1975); David Miller, The
Treatment ofArmenians in the Ottoman Empire: History of the Blue Book, 150(4) ROYAL UNITED
SERVICES INSTITUTE JOURNAL 36, (2005); JAMES BRYCE, THE TREATMENT OF ARMENIANS IN
THE OTrOMAN EMPIRE (Taderon Press, 2000) (1916). Knightly notes that the plethora of invented
atrocity stories about the Germans led to "an understandable reluctance to believe those few
atrocity stories that were true. Hari Barbly of Le Journal, Paris and Edmund Candler of The Times
both wrote horrifying stories about the atrocities the Turks were committing against the
Armenians, but their detailed and damning accusations were lost in the welter of false and
exaggerated propaganda of the period (op cit pages 104-05).
74. Controversy over the "Blue Book" has never been satisfactorily settled. Bryce was
formerly
Professor of Civil Law at Oxford and Ambassador to the US and recent research has to some
extent rehabilitated his reputation by proving some of his 'propaganda' claims true, to the extent
that it is now clear that the German army ruthlessly executed 6,500 innocent French and Belgium
civilians between August and November 1914. See JOHN HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN
ATROCITIES 1914: A HISORY OF DENIAL (2001). Toynbee, a truly great historian, compiled and
edited the "Blue Book" and was later in no doubt that its contents proved "an attempt to
exterminate the Armenians in 1915. In this case hundreds of thousands of people were done to
death and thousands turned into robbers and murderers by the administrative action of a few dozen
criminals in control of the Ottoman Empire." However, he commented (ironically), that the "Blue
Book" "was distributed as war propaganda!" See ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, THE WESTERN QUESTION
IN GREECE AND TURKEY 50,265-66 (1922).
75. DE BELLAIGUE, supra note 65, at 104.
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exercises which bought former leaders and officials to account under
domestic law at a time when international law afforded no jurisdiction to
punish officials for mass murder of their own people. The fact-finding
mission undertaken by a team led by General Harbord in September 1919 is
also credible. Harbord concluded that the massacres and deportations in the
countryside were carried out pursuant to a "definite system"-in the areas
he studied, soldiers would go from town to town, summoning all Armenian
men, aged 15-45, to government offices and then marching them off to
execution. The women, children, and old men were then set off at bayonet
point on long marches, where "starvation, typhus, and dysentery," as well
as armed attacks, took an incalculable toll.76
I have examined some of the writings of four historians relied upon by
the FCO, and I doubt whether they really understand the legal meaning of
genocide. They imagine, as the FCO imagines, that genocide requires
evidence of a specific government decision to exterminate the Armenian
race. Because no government document has been found that gives such an
order or recites such a policy, they doubt whether genocide has been
committed. They do not understand that genocide, as defined by the
Convention, may be committed by private individuals as well as by
officials, if these officials are acting with official encouragement or
acquiescence. And they do not seem to realise that its definition includes
the deliberate imposition of "conditions of life" likely to lead to death and
destruction. It is this definition of genocide, in Article 11(c) of the Genocide
Convention, which precisely describes the circumstances of the 1915
deportations.
These historians have sought to explain the circumstances under which
the deportations came to be ordered. They highlight, quite convincingly, the
tensions arising from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the
impending allied landing in the Dardanelles. They emphasise the
provocation caused by armed Armenian resistance to Turkish rule, which in
1915 led to a serious uprising in the province of Van. They point out that a
number of Armenians defected to fight with the Russian forces against the
Turks after their incursions in July, albeit after the deportations had started.
They claim that most massacres were the work of marauding Kurdish
gangs, not obviously connected with central government, and that many
deaths came from starvation and disease. All this may be true, but it serves
only to explain why the genocide happened and to identify the Kurds as one
of the perpetrator groups. It cannot serve to excuse an inexcusable crime,
committed by CUP leaders and local officials who should have known-
and obviously did know-that the conditions of life they were inflicting
76. HARBORD, supra note 59.
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upon Armenians because they were Armenians would inevitably result in
the death of a substantial proportion of that people.
In short, I consider that the evidence is compelling that the Ottoman
State is responsible, on the legal principles discussed above, for what would
now be described as genocide. Those running that state in 1915 must have
known what was apparent to unbiased foreign observers, and their racist
intention may be inferred, not just from their reported statements, but from
their knowledge of racial and religious pogroms in 1894-96 and 1909; their
deliberate fanning of racial superiority theories in the Turkification
programme; the deportation orders and their foresight of the consequences;
their failure to protect the deportees or to punish their attackers, some of
whom were state agents. They instigated, or at very least acquiesced in, the
killing of a significant part of the Armenian race-probably about half of
those who were alive in Eastern Turkey at the beginning of 1915. Put
another way-perhaps the way in which a fair minded and informed FCO
should have advised ministers would be to answer the question the
following way: if these same events occurred today, in a country with a
history similar to Turkey's in 1915, there can be no doubt that prosecutions
for genocide would be warranted and indeed required by the Genocide
Convention.
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE POLICY:
GENOCIDE DENIAL
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUESTS
In order fully to understand the government's reasoning for refusing to
acknowledge the Armenian persecution as genocide and the evidence to
which its parliamentary answers referred, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests were made to obtain the relevant documents and policy
memoranda from the FCO. The first request was rejected by the FCO,
although it admitted that it "holds information relating to these matters,
dating back over many years."77 However, it estimated that it would take
over three and a half days to locate this information and that the exercise
would cost more than the cap of £600 allowed by the Act. Given the
importance of the contemporary issue-as a result of laws against
Armenian genocide denial passed in many European countries in the last
few years-it is extraordinary that the FCO has not catalogued or collated
the requested material in any rational way so as to allow its retrieval within
77. Letter from lain Willis, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Bernard Andonian, (Aug.
5, 2008).
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three and a half days. Furthermore, this initial response was a breach of
Section 16 of the Act, which places a duty on the FCO to assist with
requests for information and to comply with the Code of Practice issued
under Section 45 of the Act. Ms. Kate Annand drafted a follow-up letter
which demanded that the FCO properly comply with Sections 16 and 45 of
the FOIA,78 and on October 16, 2008, this bore some fruit. The FCO
released to my instructing solicitors a substantial number of documents
relating to the policy as discussed and noted behind the scenes in Whitehall
over the past ten years.
This documentation came in answer to the request, "to be provided with
a copy of the evidence that this current Labour government has judged not
to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade it that these events should be
categorised as genocide." However, nothing in this documentation could be
classed as evidence, let alone any "judgment" of the kind implied in the
Lord Malloch-Brown answer. Indeed, the FCO conceded that the Labour
government since its election in 1997 simply continued the current policy of
previous governments "without a review from first principles. '79 This is an
important concession because it shows that the Labour party has never
considered the "first principles" of the Genocide Convention as applied to
the established facts of the 1915-16 massacres. Moreover, the FCO admits
that "there is no collection of documents, publications and reports by
historians, held on the relevant files, or any evidence that a series of
documents were submitted to ministers for consideration."8° What it
disclosed instead was piecemeal advice provided to ministers since 1997,
mainly by the Eastern Department of the FCO, which revealed no judgment
on the issue and no consideration of anything that could be termed
"evidence."
Parts of these documents were redacted (i.e., blacked out) by reference
to Section 27 of the FOIA, which provides that information is exempt if it
would "be likely to prejudice relations between the UK and other
countries." The FCO claims that "the disclosure of some of the information
we hold related to your request could potentially damage the bilateral
relationship between the UK and other countries, if released." From reading
between and beneath the blacked-out lines, most of the redacted sections
relate to comments about the attitude of the Turkish government. They
doubtless provide a further commentary on the government's real concern,
plain enough from the released documentation, that acknowledging a
genocide in Armenia would damage relationships with Turkey without any
78. Letter from Bernard Andonian, to lain Willis, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (Sept.
11, 2008) (on file with author).
79. Letter from Lynne Rocks, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Bernard Andonian,
(Oct. 16, 2008) (on file with author).
80. Id.
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compensating advantage for British economic or diplomatic interests. The
FCO refused to disclose, on the usual ground of cost, any written
documents for an earlier period (my solicitors had asked for similar
documentation covering the Major and part of the Thatcher administration).
They were subsequently provided, after a further request, with some policy
submissions to ministers made since 1997. This last set of documentation,
again subject to redactions pursuant to Section 27, was not supplied by the
FCO until March 13, 2009.1 No doubt by error, it included some memos
from 1995 in which the FCO discouraged the then minister (Mr. Hogg)
from attending an all-party memorial service on the 80th anniversary of the
massacres.8 2 Subsequently, Labour government ministers were similarly
discouraged.
I am still not satisfied that the FCO has fully or properly complied with
the scaled-down FOIA application. I note, for example, that a memo in
2001 claims that "research analysts" looked at views in the academic
community, yet we have not been provided with any such document. In the
debate on July 14, 2005, Lord Triesman on behalf of the government
referred to "the judgment required under the United Nations Convention...
"Such a judgment requires a demonstration ". .. that a state had intent. That
is the element that the lawyers have concluded is not shown in this case."83 I
have seen no reference in any of the material supplied to the effect that any
lawyers have ever "concluded" or advised the government on this issue or
have ever been instructed to advise. If they had, it is hardly conceivable that
no reference would ever be made to this advice in the FCO documents.
However, despite the gaps and the redactions, I now have sufficient
information to answer the questions that relate to HMG policy, the reasons
for it, and whether those reasons are consistent with international law.
POLICY DOCUMENTS - Two BASIC ERRORS
The documentation relating to the policy of the Labour government
since 1997 begins with the Eastern Department formulation on March 8,
1999 in response to Lord Avebury, who had provided a bibliography of 400
scholarly works which maintain that the Armenian massacres amount to
genocide. 84 The Department admits that it has neither the resources nor the
inclination to study these references and that any conclusion from them
(e.g., that the massacres unequivocally amounted to genocide) would not
"have an impact on present policy." The memorandum claims that "the
81. Letter from Lynne Rocks, Russia, S. Caucasus and Cent. Asia Directorate, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, to Bernard Andonian, (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with author).
82. Memorandum to Mr. Hogg (Mar. 12, 1995) (on file with author).
83. 673 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) 1212.
84. Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Minister Joyce Quin (Mar.
1999) (on file with author).
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argument is not about what happened or what to call it"-although that is
precisely what the argument was about (i.e., whether to call it "genocide").
The Eastern Department claims that it is not the work of HMG to decide
what constitutes genocide: "investigating, analysing and interpreting history
is a matter for historians." At the outset, this basic error can be detected,
namely HMG's reliance upon historians to decide a legal issue. Deciding
what amounts to genocide is a matter for judgment according to
international law and not at all a matter for historians. Historians establish
facts; lawyers must judge whether those facts amount to a breach of
international law.
It further appears from this memorandum that the Eastern Department
is simply not interested, and does not want HMG to be interested, in the
question of whether the massacres amount to genocide. The memorandum
notes that 600,000 Armenians were killed and "hundreds of thousands more
died in flight" (in fact, they were killed in the course of being deported). It
further asserts that "some historians say there is evidence that the deaths
were part of a deliberate state policy, or that the Ottoman government must
have given at least tacit approval to the killings. But we know of no
documentary evidence to prove this."85 Here, we have another canard that
appears routinely and repeatedly in Eastern Department memoranda: the
notion that there must be some written document that records a government
or leadership decision to exterminate the Armenian people. No such
document, of course, exists in relation to the Nazi Holocaust, or (as the
International Tribunal in Rwanda has pointed out) in relation to the
Rwandan Genocide.86 It is obviously wrong to suggest that there must be
documentary evidence of a policy decision to commit genocide before it is
possible to make a finding of genocide.
The memorandum goes on, rather cynically, to consider the clout of the
campaign to recognise the genocide and notes that "the campaign does not
appear at this stage to have enough support or direction to seriously
embarrass HMG. 's With this cynical message to ministers, the
recommendation is to follow the longstanding "line" that:
HMG has long recognised the massacres of 1915, and they were
condemned by parliament in the strongest terms, but a) there is no
evidence to show the Ottoman government took a specific decision
to eliminate the Armenians under their control at that time and b) it
85. Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, E. Dep't, to Minister Joyce
Quin and others, (Apr. 12, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter April 12 Memo].
86. Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, 2088
(Dec. 18, 2008) "With respect to the actus reus, the agreement can be proven by establishing the
existence of planning meetings for the genocide, but it can also be inferred, based on
circumstantial evidence. The concerted or coordinated action of a group of individuals can
constitute evidence of an agreement." Id.
87. April 12 Memo, supra note 85.
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is for historians, not governments, to interpret the past.88
This formulation embodies the two basic errors. First, the failure to
recognise that there is no requirement for evidence of a "specific
government decision" or indeed any documented decision to eliminate all
Armenians under government control as an element of the crime of
genocide. Second, the failure to understand that it is a matter for legal
judgment, and not a matter for historians, as to whether past events amount
to a crime of genocide. The latter error was compounded by the Eastern
Department in a draft of the letter responding to Lord Avebury which the
minister (Joyce Quin) was asked to endorse as follows: "I continue to
believe that it is not the business of the British or any government to
pronounce on matters more properly addressed by historians. We must
leave it to the experts."89
Historians, of course, as will become all too clear, are not experts on
genocide. This was the Eastern Department draft, which the minister did not
send. She did, however, write to Lord Avebury on February 9, 1999,
stating, "[I]t is for historians to interpret the past and society learns and
benefits from their assessment of events. Generally speaking, I do not think
it is the job of today's government to review past events with a view to
pronouncing on them according to today's values and attitudes." 9° That the
values and attitudes in respect of genocide are timeless did not seem to
occur to the minister.
THE 1999 HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATE
The matter came to a head a few months later with a full-scale debate in
the House of Lords initiated by Baroness Cox. A note from the Eastern
Department put the matter exactly in perspective. It said bluntly:
HMG is open to criticism in terms of the ethical dimension. But
given the importance, of our relations (political, strategic and
commercial) with Turkey, and that recognising the genocide would
provide no practical benefit to the UK or the few survivors of the
killings still alive today, nor would it help a rapprochement
between Armenia and Turkey, the current line is the only feasible
option. 9'
This reveals the cynical truth behind the position urged by the FCO on
Labour government ministers over the next decade, and almost invariably
accepted by them without demur. The FCO urged that the position they
88. Id.
89. Draft Letter for Joyce Quin to reply to Lord Avebury (undated) (on file with author).
90. Letter from Joyce Quin, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Lord
Avebury, (Feb. 9, 1999) (on file with author).
91. April 12 Memo, supra note 85.
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were taking was open to ethical question, but that the economic, strategic
and political importance of maintaining good relations with Turkey meant
that the ethical dimension should be ignored. There was no countervailing
profit in making any answer that might displease them. In other words, this
particular genocide could not be recognised, not because it had not taken
place, but because it was politically and commercially inconvenient to do
SO.
In this note, dated April 12, 1999, the FCO repeated the familiar, and
doubly mistaken, mantra that "we are aware of no evidence of intent on the
part of the Ottoman administration of the day to destroy the Armenians (a
key element in the crime of genocide) and that it is for historians, not
governments, to determine what happened. 9 2 The FCO even sounded a
note of caution about the Secretary of State's use of the word "genocide" to
describe the actions of Milosevic and his Serb forces in "ethnically
cleansing" Kosovo. There was concern that this would provoke calls for the
same label to be attached to the massacres of the Armenians whose "ethnic
cleansing" by way of deportation was, after all, of a different level of
gravity than the sufferings of the Kosovars, who were not starved and
attacked and killed in their hundreds of thousands.
Attached to this note was a draft speech, which Baroness Ramsey,
speaking for the government, delivered virtually verbatim on April 14th.93
As well as claiming that there was no evidence of "a specific decision to
eliminate the Armenians," the speech considered whether a tribunal like the
ICTY or ICTR should be set up to resolve the issue, but pointed out that
respective defendants were long since dead and said that it "had not been
established... if the genocide convention can be applied retrospectively"-
a point to which, some years later, Mr. Geoff Hoon, MP, was to return. It is
a bad point, in the sense that the rule against retroactivity applies to
criminal charges, made against individuals, of offences which were not
against the law at the time they were allegedly committed. Nobody is
suggesting that criminal charges should be brought now against long dead
individuals-the question is whether the massacre of the Armenians is
correctly described as "genocide," according to the definition adopted by
the UN Convention in 1948.
The Eastern Department brief was at least read by one minister, Joyce
Quin. She took exception to its extreme "genocide denial" position, which
included lines such as "we are aware of no firm evidence of intent on the
part of the Ottoman administration of the day to destroy the Armenians"
and "HMG has no first hand evidence of why the atrocities took place."
Quin privately and correctly pointed out, the day before the debate, that the
92. Id.
93. 599 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1999) 827.
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question of intent had never been examined by the government or by
anyone else in the FCO.94 These passages were duly deleted. But the very
fact that the FCO, without any investigation, could actually inform a
minister of state that there was no firm evidence of intent (were they
unaware of Ambassador Morgenthau's conversations with Talaat, or of the
Harbord Report, or of the Treaty of S~vres, or of the Constantinople trial
verdicts?) and that there was no first hand evidence of why the atrocities
took place (ignoring the hundreds of witness statements from victims,
missionaries, consular officials, etc.) does show the extent to which
genocide denial had entrenched itself in the Eastern Department by this
time. Britain's condemnation of Turkey in 1915 upon ample evidence for a
"crime against humanity" no longer echoes down the corridors of an FCO
which now seems all too willing to turn a blind eye to genocide in the
interest of political and commercial relations with Turkey.
THREE "DENIAL" HISTORIANS
A few days after this debate, the Turkish Ambassador initiated a
correspondence, which continued over the following years, with several
FCO ministers: Joyce Quin, Keith Vaz, and Baroness Scotland. He sent
them extracts from work by an American historian, Justin McCarthy, and
sought to portray the 1915 killings as having been provoked by "Armenian
terrorists" who continue to murder Turkish diplomats to this very day. He
claimed that more Turks than Armenians died, the latter not from
government action but from "starvation, disease and attacks by guerrillas
which the authorities at the time were powerless to prevent."95 The Turkish
Embassy was pleased with the FCO's position of refusing to acknowledge
genocide "in the absence of unequivocal evidence to show the Ottoman
administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians." The
Turkish embassy believes this to be "the correct view and [it] hope[s] it
would be maintained. 96
This hope has been well-founded. Keith Vaz told the Turkish
Ambassador97 that the government had refused to include the Armenian
massacres as part of Holocaust Memorial Day. This decision, Mr. Vaz
makes clear, reflected "wide inter-departmental consultation, including with
the FCO." The controversial decision to exclude the Armenian massacres
from Holocaust Memorial Day was, therefore, influenced by the flawed
94. Letter on behalf of Joyce Quin, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to
the E. Dep't of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Apr. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
95. Letter from Turkish Chargt d'Affaires, to Baroness Scotland, Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (Aug. 7, 2000) (on file with author).
96. Letter from Turkish Charg6 d'Affaires, to Baroness Scotland, Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (Aug. 7, 2000) (on file with author).
97. Letter from Keith Vaz, to Ambassador H.E. Korkmaz Haktanir, Turkish Foreign Ministry
Under-Secretary (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
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perspective of the Eastern Department, overly concerned to maintain good
relations with Turkey.
Mr. Justin McCarthy, the historian proffered by the Turkish
government, is a professor at Louisville University. He has a different
emphasis, but I do not regard his analysis either as legally correct or as
factually excluding a finding of genocide. He sees the 1915 events as a civil
war and describes it as "a war of extermination. If you were caught by the
other side you were killed. Neither side spared women or children."98 This
description can fit the definition of genocide if one side's killing has been
directed or permitted by its government or government officials on racial or
religious grounds.
McCarthy admits that the Ottoman government,
ordered the deportation of the Armenians of Anatolia to Syria...
on the ensuing forced marches great numbers of Armenians died
from hunger and attacks, many of them killed by the tribesman who
were involved in a war to the death with the Armenians. There is no
question but that the convoys were not well protected by the
Ottomans. However, more than 200,000 Armenian deportees
arrived safely in greater Syria.99
This too is entirely consistent with a finding of genocide: that some
victims survived (as they did in Nazi Germany, Rwanda and even in
Cambodia) is nothing to the point. The government bears command
responsibility for ordering the forced marches and deciding not to protect
the convoys adequately, in the knowledge that many on the "death
marches" would be killed. McCarthy is a historian who appears not to
understand the law relating to genocide, and so makes the curious remark"'0
that "[i]f this was genocide, it was a very strange genocide indeed in which
many more killers than victims perished." Numbers do not matter: it is the
question of genocidal intent that counts. Besides, in 1915, the victims were
predominantly Armenian, unless McCarthy is counting the Turkish losses
in the Dardanelles and on the Russian front, which would make an entirely
false point since most of those Turks were killed by the Allies and not the
Armenians. Even assuming those skewed figures, a much higher proportion
of Armenians than Turks were killed. And the figures are skewered if the
comparison is with the Turks who were killed by Armenian brigades and
brigands when the Russian army invaded later in 1916. There were
massacres then, certainly, although a respected Turkish historian puts
98. JUSTIN MCCARTHY, THE OTTOMAN TURKS: AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY TO 1923 365
(1997).
99. Id.
100. Justin McCarthy, Armenian Terrorism: History as Poison and Antidote, in PROCEEDINGS
OF SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 85-94 (Ankara University Press, 1984).
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Turkish casualties at Armenian hands at about 40,000."'1 McCarthy is
obviously sympathetic to the Turkish cause, but his work does not, as HMG
is later to claim, refute the genocide charge. The truth is that a substantial
proportion of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire perished and few
survived in Anatolia.
McCarthy is one of the three historians upon whom the FCO relies for
its stance of genocide equivocation. In the FCO material, however, I note
that he admits that half a million Armenians perished "as a result of their
armed rebellion against the Ottoman state." But, because most of the
victims on the marches were women, children, and old men, this seems a
propagandist rather than an accurate comment. McCarthy goes on to admit
the causes of death were "sickness, exhaustion following long marches,
immediate change of climate and the attacks of marauders upon rich
convoys." These are all life-threatening conditions of which those who
ordered the deportations must have known. Indeed, anyone who has
examined the contemporaneous photographs of the huddled masses
carrying their few possessions may find his description of "rich convoys"
both misleading and distasteful. He adds that "the Turks are estimated to
have lost over 1 million people owing to similar causes." Yet, estimated by
whom, in relation to what period? There were no deportations of Muslims
ordered by the Ottoman government, and there were comparatively few
Turkish casualties of the uprisings in four Armenian cities (only one of
which, in Van, was successful). Of course, thousands of Muslims were
displaced (from homes that in many cases they had taken over from
deportees) by the subsequent advance in parts of Anatolia by the Russian
army (which had a brigade of Armenian volunteers). Over a million Turks
lost their lives in the course of a war the Ottoman government chose to
enter on the side of Germany, but to suggest that this in any way detracts
from the genocide would be disingenuous: the comparison is not of like
with like. The heinousness of the Holocaust cannot be diminished, let alone
excused, by claiming that more Germans than Jews died in the World War
II. It is unacceptable that the FCO should place as much reliance as it has
upon an American professor whose work does not in fact (for all that the
Turkish Ambassador may think) deny the facts that can in law constitute
genocide.
There was further pro-Turkish advice from the Eastern Department in
2001 as it prepared answers to questions put down by Lord Biffm arising
from the Holocaust Day exclusion. One favoured approach was to say that
"interpretation of events is still the subject of genuine debate among
historians." There is a background note that "research analysts looked again
at the balance of views in the academic community last year: they
101. AHMED EMi, TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR 222 (Yale University Press, 1930).
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confirmed that disagreements remained." 112 No such analysis has been
disclosed, and the FCO covering letter responding to the FOIA request
denies that anything of the kind exists. There is still no understanding that
academic historians establish facts, but the question of genocide is for legal
judgment. It is plain, in any event, that the great majority of historians of
the period have recorded facts that are only consistent with genocide, and
even the work of Justin McCarthy, relied upon by the Turkish government,
does not exclude this legal characterisation.
An FCO draft answer for Baroness Scotland to give to Lord Biffin in
2001 stated,
additionally, the government's legal advisors have said that the
1948 UN Convention on genocide, which is in any event not
retrospective in application, was drafted in response to the
holocaust and whilst the term can be applied to tragedies that
occurred subsequent to the holocaust, such as Rwanda, it cannot be
applied retrospectively.° 3
This seems to be a dubious attempt to blind parliament with bogus legal
science, and if the government's legal advisors ever said that the term
cannot be applied to "tragedies" before the Holocaust, they are palpably
mistaken. Of course the term "genocide" can be applied retrospectively, and
frequently is-to the attempted extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines
in the 1830s, for example."° A retrospective prosecution for the crime of
genocide (as distinct from war crimes or crimes against humanity) may not
be brought in respect of conduct before the Genocide Convention, but that
is an entirely different matter. Moreover, the 1948 Convention was not
drafted solely in response to the Holocaust. The historical evidence shows
that Raphael Lemkin had the Armenian genocide very much in mind in
conceiving the Convention, which includes an indirect reference to the
Armenian genocide in its Preamble. There is no reference in the policy
documents to any advice from government lawyers, who, if they did give it
must have been unacquainted with the drafting history of the Genocide
Convention.
HMG's policy was next considered in 2004, after the Armenian
government had taken offence when the British Ambassador
undiplomatically emphasised the view that there was "no unequivocal
102. FCO Background Document regarding question from Lord Biffen, Tabled on Jan. 25 ,
2001 (on file with author).
103. Draft response for Baroness Scotland to Parliamentary Question Background Document
relating to a written question from Lord Biffen, Tabled on Jan. 25b , 2001 (on file with author).
104. The entire race was exterminated by British soldiers and convicts and settlers on
mainland Tasmania: the 47 survivors were exiled to an offshore island. A parliamentary
committee reported in 1838, endorsing Sir Gilbert Murray, that this was "an indelible stain" on
British reputation: an apt description of the crime of genocide, a century before Lemkin coined the
word.
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evidence" that genocide had ever been committed. A memorandum to
Secretary of State Bill Rammell admits that Turkey "devotes major
diplomatic resources to heading off any possible recognition. Turkey would
react very strongly indeed to any suggestion of recognition by the UK.""'
This was the reason why Simon Butt recommended that the policy should
be maintained.
At some point, either in 2004 or 2005 (the disclosed memoranda are
undated), the FCO supplied the usual mantra to ministers for answers in the
House but suggested that, "if pressed," they might add the following:
There is genuine debate amongst historians as to whether or not the
events of 1915-16 would constitute genocide as defined by the
1948 UN Convention. Prominent historians who dispute the
genocide label include Professor Bernard Lewis, formerly of
Princeton, Dr Heath Lowry of Princeton and Professor Justin
McCarthy of the University of Louisville." 6
The Turkish ambassador, as we have seen, provided text from Justin
McCarthy back in 2001 and a later exchange suggests that these three
names may originally have been supplied by an FCO researcher, Craig
Oliphant. They appear first in March 2001 in a letter written by Keith Vaz
to an MP who asked on what sources the FCO were relying.'0 7 Vaz wrote,
"Professor Bernard Lewis formerly of Princeton... said in 1993 that it was
'extremely doubtful' that the Turks had carried out a policy of systematic
annihilation." He added that both Heath Lowry and Justin McCarthy
"dispute that the evidence supports a verdict of genocide."
Bernard Lewis is a well-known professor of Middle Eastern Studies.
What Vaz did not reveal was that Lewis' remark, in an interview with Le
Monde in 1993, caused him to be prosecuted in France and fined (if only
one franc) for denying the Armenian genocide. °8 In a later interview, he
said, "no one disputes that terrible things happened" and that hundreds of
thousands of Armenians died.'0 9 He explained that he had only been seeking
in Le Monde to deny the claim that there was a close parallel between the
sufferings of the Armenians and the sufferings of the Jews in Nazi
105. Memorandum from Simon Butt, FCO Official, to Bill Rammell, Secretary of State (Mar.
19, 2004) (on file with author).
106. Armenia: Public Lines, (undated) (on file with author). It goes on to dismiss Ben
Whittaker's report.
107. Letter from Keith Vaz, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Julia
Down, Member of Parliament (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
108. See Letter from Bernard Lewis to the Princeton Alumni Magazine (June 15, 1996) (on
file with author).
109. See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris,
June 21, 1995, J. Cochard (Fr.) (citing the Le Monde interview published on Nov. 18, 1993, and
the clarification offered by Bernard Lewis printed in Le Monde on Jan. 1, 1994) available at
http://www.armeniangenocide.org/Affirmation.240/current-category.76/affirmation-detail.html.
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Germany. Some of the former were active in fighting against the state while
the latter were not in any kind of armed opposition to Nazi rule. Lewis
accepted that "the Turks certainly resorted to very ferocious methods" in
repelling Armenian freedom fighters but insisted "there is clear evidence of
a decision by the Turkish government to deport the Armenian
population .... There is no evidence of a decision to massacre. ' 110 Lewis
does not understand that a finding of genocide may be inferred from a
government's deliberate failure to protect those it is deporting, the majority
of whom-women and children-were certainly not active in fighting
against the state. Lewis complains that "nowadays the word 'genocide' is
used very loosely even in cases where no bloodshed is involved at all."''
This is not a complaint that could be made against labelling as "genocide"
events in which up to half the members of a particular race were
exterminated. The Vaz letter suggests that Lewis is an FCO "source," but
there is no evidence in the documents that he has ever been consulted. It
may well be that the FCO was only alerted to Lewis' view as a result of the
publicity about his prosecution.
Dr. Heath Lowry is a controversial figure who provoked the "Heath
Lowry affair" after Princeton University accepted a large sum of money
from the Turkish government and appointed him to the "Ataturk Chair,"
which that government sponsored. Controversy erupted when Dr. Lowry
was discovered to have drafted letters for the Turkish ambassador denying
the genocide." 2 Both Dr. Lowry and the University were condemned by a
petition of over one hundred leading writers and scholars, including Arthur
Miller, Harold Pinter, Susan Sontag, William Styron, John Updike, Kurt
Vonnegut, Norman Mailer, Seamus Heaney, Deborah Lipstadt, and Allen
Ginsberg. It is only fair to point out that writers may have no greater insight
into the law of genocide than historians, and it does not appear that Dr.
Lowry in his personal capacity has actually denied the genocide, but has
merely said that he is reluctant to apply this label to the massacres until he
has fully studied the Ottoman archives. He maintains that he "cannot accept
the characterisation of this human tragedy as a pre-planned, state
perpetrated genocide.., unless and until the historical records of the
Ottoman state ... are studied and evaluated by competent scholars."'13
According to a website that supports Dr. Lowry, his privileged access to the
Ottoman archives has enabled him to find one document which, according
to Dr. Lowry, "strongly suggests that there was government involvement in
110. Professor Bernard Lewis, Comments made at the National Press Club, (Mar. 25, 2002).
111. Id.
112. Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen, & Robert Jay Lifton, Professional Ethics and the
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113. Rich Miller, History and the Power to Change it Academic Leaders Erupt Over
Appearance of Turkish Influence at Princeton, THE TRENTON TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995.
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the killing of Armenians."' 4 In any case, historians who take a pro-Turkish
position after having taken Turkish government money and proffered
special access to documents have a conflict of interest. Given the
controversy surrounding Dr. Lowry, his comparatively modest scholarly
standing,
and his financial relationship with the Turkish government, he is a
strange choice for the British government to rely upon in support of its
position of genocide denial, or at least of genocide-equivocation.
FURTHER INQUIRIES
In the 2004-2005 memoranda, there is a "background memo" attached,
which makes some attempt to be fair:
The extent to which the killings were official government policy is
a long standing dispute. But the Young Turk movement which
ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1908 undoubtedly had come to
believe that the Armenians posed a threat to the unity and security
of the empire.... Non-partisan non-specialist European historians
would seem to agree that there was some official collusion. But
how far did it go? ... One such historian A L McFie: The end of
the Ottoman Empire 1908-23 (Longman 1998) draws the following
balance: "It is difficult if not impossible, to escape the conclusion
that, once the deportations were instituted the Ottoman leadership,
or at least elements in it were not averse to exploiting the
opportunity to resolve a problem that had for decades caused the
empire much difficulty."15
This cautious conclusion is the only approximation to historical truth to be
found in the many hundreds of pages of legally obtuse FCO briefings to
ministers about the lack of evidence for genocide.
Nonetheless, in mid-2005, HMG's pro-Turkish position was revisited
and confirmed. Pressed about Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, under
which a number of writers and intellectuals had been convicted for
mentioning the Armenian genocide, the FCO claimed that alleging
genocide was not prohibited by the Code but only by the "explanatory note"
about what it should cover." 6 This was a pettifogging response to the
persecution by Turkey of citizens for speaking the truth, or at least for
publishing honest and well-sourced opinion. It is a blatant contravention of
114. Lis Verderman, Professor Feels the Heat, THE PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Jan. 24,
1996, at 14-15.
115. FCO Document, Background: Armenia 1915-16 (on file with author).
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view ofihe article in Turkey's Penal Code that describes affirmation of the Armenian "genocide"
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Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In 2005, the Minister for Europe, Dennis McShane, suggested an
Independent International Commission to review the massacres of 1915.
He, no doubt, had a judicial commission in mind, but the Turkish
government agreed only to seek an investigation by a committee of
historians. The Armenian government replied that this will not solve the
problem, as indeed it will not. A decisive way of authoritatively settling the
issue would be for the UN to set up an ad hoc international court to look at
all the evidence (adduced, no doubt, with the help of historians) and decide
whether the conduct of the Ottoman authorities amounted to complicity in
genocide. In September 2009, the Turkish and Armenian governments, after
mediation by the Swiss, agreed to a protocol for the establishment of
diplomatic relations. This welcome development included a promise to
"implement dialogue on the historical dimension" through "an impartial
scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define
existing problems and formulate recommendations.""' 7 The Turkish press
hailed this as an Armenian acceptance of a "Commission of Historians,"
although the language indicates merely a preliminary investigation. There is
no authoritative decision that will come from a committee of historians; the
issue requires an independent judicial decision. Any "definition of existing
problems" would have to begin by the repeal of Article 301 of the Turkish
Penal Code, which, as interpreted, makes it an offence to use the word
"genocide" in Turkey with respect to the Armenian massacres.
There has been one credible international inquiry, and it is
extraordinary that amongst the hundreds of pages of FCO policy
documents, there is only one obscure and dismissive reference to it. It was
directed by the UN's Economic and Social Council (at the request of the
Commission on Human Rights) and conducted by its Special Rapporteur on
Genocide, Mr. Ben Whitaker, a British barrister and former Labour MP for
Hampstead. Mr. Whitaker had no hesitation in concluding that the 1915
atrocities amounted to genocide." 8 This was the key issue for his decision:
the previous rapporteur had initially concluded that Turkey was guilty of
genocide, but had removed this finding after Turkish protests in order to
"maintain unity within the international community." ' 9 Whitaker's report is
a powerful document which should weigh with any British government,
although, surprisingly, there is no other reference to it in the FCO material.
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RECENT PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS
In 2006, Steven Pound initiated an adjournment debate on the issue.
The FCO briefed Geoff Hoon that,
HMG has long argued in the absence of unequivocal evidence to
show that the Ottoman administration took a specific decision to
eliminate the Armenians under their control at the time, British
governments have not recognised the events of 1915-16 as
genocide. There has been no reason to change that position.I"
However, by this stage, eight EU parliaments had passed resolutions
recognising the genocide: France, Italy, Poland, Greece, Cyprus, Belgium,
Slovakia, and the Netherlands, not to mention the Holy See, Uruguay,
Argentina, Russia, Lebanon, and Canada. Various parliaments, including
the German Bundestag and the US House of Representatives Foreign
Affairs Committee, were debating the issue."'2 The FCO briefing continued:
Turkey is neuralgic and defensive about the charge of genocide
despite the fact that the events occurred at the time of the Ottoman
Empire as opposed to modem day Turkey. There were many Turks
who lost their lives in the war and there may also be an element of
concern over compensation claims should they accept the charge of
genocide. This defensiveness has meant that Turkey has historically
stifled debate at home and devoted considerable diplomatic effort to
dissuading any further recognition.' 22
The debate initiated by Steven Pound went ahead on June 7, 2006. Geoff
Hoon, for the government, faithfully read his FCO brief. But this time,
while repeating that "the evidence is not sufficiently unequivocal," he
flagged up a relatively new point:
The fact is that the legal offence of genocide had not been named or
defined at the time that the actual atrocities were committed. The
United Nations convention on genocide came into force in 1948, so
it was not possible at the time of the events that we are considering
legally to label the massacres as genocide within the terms of the
convention.
I recognise that it is perfectly possible intellectually to try to
apply the definitions of genocide from the convention to appalling
tragedies that occurred, in this case, some 30 years before. The
common practice in law is not to apply such judgments
120. Briefing Note to Geoff Hoon from Russia, South Caucasus and Central Asia Directorate,
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retrospectively. 123
This is nonsense. There is no "common practice in law" not to apply the
definitions of genocide "intellectually" to tragedies that occurred before the
Convention was ratified. The "common practice in law" is to not prosecute
a crime that did not exist at the time it was committed, but nobody is talking
about prosecution because there is no one left to prosecute. Mr. Hoon went
on to say that it is not possible to provide a substitute today "for the
submission of evidence, cross-examination or arguments that necessarily
would have arisen in a court of law." But the motion was not seeking any
such inquiry. Of course, if Turkey and Armenia were to agree to an
international judicial tribunal, the processes of submitting evidence and
cross-examining experts would be perfectly possible. If Mr. Hoon suggests
that there is some technical legal inhibition about describing the 1915
massacres as genocide, he is under a misapprehension.
In October 2006, Mr. Hoon visited Armenia. The resulting brief was
largely the same as his FCO brief. However, paragraph 5 (which has been
heavily redacted for fear of damaging relations with Turkey) does end with
the unredacted sentence "Turkey would react very strongly indeed to any
suggestion of recognition by the UK." 124 This undoubtedly explains the real
reason for the FCO advice and for the HMG position throughout the present
Labour government and under previous governments.
In March 2007, Lord Avebury returned to the fray by asking for the
names of the British historians on whom HMG relies for its refusal to
describe the treatment of Armenians in 1915-16 as genocide. HMG
responded that the FCO had "input from a variety of historical sources and
works."' 25 This was seriously misleading. It is belied by the response to the
FCO request. The only sources mentioned were the "Blue Book" (which
contains witness statements irreconcilable with genocide denial) and a
British historian named Malcolm Yapp, who was said to "question" other
accounts. Professor Yapp is a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of
the Middle Eastern Studies Journal, who has indeed questioned Vahakn
Dadrian's The History of the Armenian Genocide, but not in a way that
refutes his allegation of genocide. 2 6 Yapp accepts that the massacres took
place and that "there was some connivance and even participation by local
Ottoman officials." He accepts that the Ottoman government ordered the
deportations "without adequate arrangements for the transport, food or
123. 447 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 136WH.
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security." He says that "although Dadrian produces many reports seeming
to suggest that members of the Ottoman government wanted to destroy the
Armenians, he fails to find any document which constitutes a definite order
for massacre." This failure, as I have pointed out, is not crucial. No such
documents are to be found in Nazi or Rwandan government papers, either,
although the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. Yapp does not
purport to apply the law, and his book review provides no basis for HMG to
deny genocide.
On July 2, 2007, a memorandum on HMG's position on the Armenian
genocide restated the position that "there is an absence of unequivocal
evidence to prove that at the top level the Ottoman administration took a
specific decision to eliminate all Armenians under their rule.' 27 It further
added the misleading claim that "it is not common practice in law to apply
judgments retrospectively." There can be no logical or legal objection to an
authoritative judgment which decides whether the events of 1915 satisfy the
1948 definition.
The suggestion made by Mr. Dennis McShane, MP, to set up an
independent commission is fully endorsed in this memo, although the only
commission that Turkey was offering to set up was one comprising
historians-plainly a pointless exercise. This appears to have become a
mantra. At a meeting with Andrew George, MP, on October 16, 2007,
ministers were briefed to encourage pro-Armenian MPs to lobby the
Armenian government to respond more positively to the Turkish suggestion
of a commission of historians, and this pressure may have produced the
concession made in the protocol for resumed diplomatic relations.
Throughout this voluminous material, there is never any mention that
HMG denounced the massacres in 1915 as "a crime against humanity."
Indeed, some memos read as if the government had denounced both sides
and had not blamed the Turks. The FCO again reveals its hand in this
briefing, telling the -minister that "this is an emotive subject and we do not
anticipate an easy meeting-ultimately there is no positive message that
HMG can give to this audience on this issue. But it is important to
demonstrate that we are listening."'28 In other words, HMG has a closed
mind on the subject but will pretend that it is at least partly open. Because
the delegation comprised not only Armenia Solidarity members but also the
Vice-Chairman of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the
FCO's advice was, in effect, to string them along, despite the fact that "the
genocide scholar in the group is likely to take issue" with HMG's
127. Memorandum from the Russ. S. Caucasus and Cent. Asia Directorate, FCO, to Mr.
Murphy (July 2, 2007) (on file with author).
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position. 29 There is no sign that anyone at the FCO had read Professor
David Bloxham's book, The Great Game of Genocide, which powerfully
refutes its genocide denial stance. Genocide scholarship is one thing that the
FCO has never been interested in applying to an issue it wishes would go
away. There is no reference in the papers to the 2007 Resolution of the
International Association of Genocide Scholars, which stated that "the
Ottoman campaign against Christian minorities of the empire between
1914-1923 constituted a genocide against Armenians and the Assyrians and
Pontian and Anatolian Greeks." The FCO merely evinces concern that the
US House Foreign Affairs Committee had resolved to recognise the events
as genocide: as a result, "we can also expect the Armenian diaspora
worldwide lobbying machine to go into overdrive." This is hardly the
language of an impartial enquirer: the FCO has become a rather cynical
adversary.
Although the FCO accepts that Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code
can result in charges of "insulting Turkishness" made against those who
allege genocide (such as Orhan Pamuk and Harant Dink), this is not a
matter for anxious lobbying in support of free speech. HMG's position in
2007 hardened behind the Bush administration's support for Turkey.
Fearing that a negative Turkish reaction would harm US interests,
particularly its NSA surveillance bases and its oil interests, President Bush
took the unusual step of speaking out before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee passed Resolution 106 calling upon him to "ensure that the
foreign policy of the US reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity
concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide
documented in the US record relating to the Armenian genocide and for
other purposes."'30 Bush said, "this resolution is not the right response to
these historic mass killings, and its passage would do great harm to our
relations with a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror." On
October 23, 2007, Prime Minister Blair met Prime Minister Erdogan of
Turkey who said "that his view remained that the 'genocide' was an issue
for historians." This is the position that, as we have seen, the FCO had long
promoted. There is no suggestion in the heavily redacted minutes that Mr.
Blair made any suggestion of a truth and reconciliation process, or pointed
out the importance of nations coming to terms with their own past.
THE DOWNING STREET WEBSITE INCIDENT
In 2008, the FCO was caught out when its stock response about
historians being unable to agree about genocide was placed on the Downing
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Street website in answer to an e-petition, and its inaccuracy was pointed out
by members of the public. FCO draftsperson Sofka Brown was warned by a
colleague, Matthew Extance, about high level dissatisfaction with this
"line." Apparently, the minister, Jim Murphy, had demanded to know
exactly what evidence had been deemed "not sufficiently unequivocal." His
demand "very specifically requests a detailed list of all the evidence looked
at which leads us to believe that the evidence is not sufficiently
unequivocal." This request may have proved difficult for Ms. Brown; the
FOIA response reveals there had been no evidence properly looked at
within the FCO, at least since 1997. She urgently requested one Craig
Oliphant to provide some names. 3' Mr. Oliphant replied, just three hours
later, with three familiar names. He cited the three sceptics put forward in
2001 and 2005: Bernard Lewis, Justin McCarthy, and Dr. Heath Lowry.
Oliphant offers an "intermediate view" in McFie and in Dr. Eric Zuercher,
whose view is not "intermediate" at all. Dr. Zuercher writes:
[T]here are indications that, while the Ottoman government as such
was not involved in genocide, an inner circle within the Committee
of Union and Progress under the direction of Talaat wanted to
"solve" the Eastern Question by the extermination of the
Armenians and that it used the relocation as a cloak for this
policy. 13 2
Then Oliphant cites six historians who have written "authoritative"
accounts of what they firmly describe as genocide.
The FCO ploy of citing historians on either side, which can give the
misleading impression that the historians are equally divided did not, on
this occasion, pass muster. The draft answer made no mention of historians
and was accompanied by a handwritten explanation to Jim Murphy, the
responsible Minister (perhaps by Andrew Page, the Head of Department):
"Jim-added some more detail as requested. Not mentioned historians
explicitly. We stopped referring to historians in June 2007 when this new
line was deployed. We found that references to historians tended to raise
further questions/allegations.' 33
This may signal the end of the familiar FCO "spin" about divided
historians. However, Murphy appears to have been pacified. His answer,
given by Lord Malloch-Brown on March 4th, 2008, was a brief restatement
of the classic formula: "neither this Government nor previous Governments
have judged that the evidence is sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that
these events should be categorised as genocide as defined by the 1948 UN
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Convention on Genocide." '34
This was, of course, misleading. The documents since 1997 now
establish that this government has not "judged the evidence" at all. It has
neither judged, nor been provided with evidence on which to judge. The
FCO has never sought such evidence, other than by asking Craig Oliphant
for a few names on each side.
What is meant by saying that the evidence is "not sufficiently
unequivocal?" This is a standard of proof that seems to have been invented
by the FCO, playing with words, and does not reflect the law. There are
only two standards of proof in UK law: the civil standard (on the balance of
probabilities, i.e., more likely than not) and the criminal standard (beyond
reasonable doubt).
The House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, has made it clear that there
is just one standard of proof in civil proceedings and that any heightened
standard must mean the criminal standard of proof. Lord Hoffmann has
confirmed this:
I think that the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is
only one civil standard of proof and that is proof that the fact in
issue more probably occurred than not.... clarity would be greatly
enhanced if the courts said simply that although the proceedings
were civil, the nature of the particular issue involved made it
appropriate to apply the criminal standard.135
To apply a test of whether evidence is "not sufficiently unequivocal"
therefore makes no sense. The term is an oxymoron (something is either
unequivocal, or it is not; it cannot be a little bit unequivocal). The phrase
seems to have been chosen by the FCO not only to beg the question but to
fudge it. It has invented a meaningless new standard under which the bar
can be set impossibly high.
CONCLUSIONS
The result of my examination of the advice provided by the FCO to
HMG, and reproduced by ministers in parliamentary answers drafted over
the past decade by the FCO, is that this advice reflects neither the law of
genocide nor the demonstrable facts of the massacres in 1915-16, and has
been calculated to mislead parliament into believing that there has been an
assessment of evidence and an exercise of judgment on that evidence.
The truth is that throughout the life of the present Labour government
and (so the FCO admits) throughout previous governments, there has been
no proper or candid appraisal of the 1915 events. These events were
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condemned by HMG at the time, and immediately afterwards, in terms that
anticipate the modem definition of genocide. The drafters of the Genocide
Convention referred to the 1915 mass killings as a prime example of the
kind of atrocity that would be covered by this new international crime.
HMG has consistently (at least until 2007) wrongly maintained both that the
decision is one for historians and that historians are divided on the subject.
HMG ignores the fact that the decision is one for legal judgment, and no
reputable historian could possibly deny the central facts of the deportations
and the racial and religious motivations behind the deaths of a significant
proportion of the Armenian people.
HMG has also maintained the fiction that it is somehow contrary to
legal practice to apply the description "genocide" to events that occurred
prior to 1948. This and other mistaken or illogical arguments have been
made, so the internal policy memoranda reveal, in a hitherto successful
effort not to upset the "neuralgic" Turkish government. The dubious ethics
involved in this approach have been acknowledged (once, back in 1999),
but there appears to be no interest in establishing the truth of the matter or
re-asserting the position that HMG took at the time, or in understanding (let
alone applying) the modem law of genocide as it has emerged from
decisions of the ICJ, the ICTY, and the ICTR. There is no recognition at all
of the importance of nations acknowledging their past crimes against
humanity, or of supporting the descendents of victims who still, almost a
century later, have to live with the consequences.
In my opinion, the law set out above, when applied to the facts,
produces the inevitable conclusion that the treatment of the Armenians in
1915 answers to the description of genocide. The historians relied upon by
the FCO in support of its refusal to accept this conclusion do not, on
analysis, sustain the FCO position or affect my opinion. Should the question
put by Baronness Cox and others be asked again, the proper answer would
be as follows:
In 1915, the Turkish government, then in league with Germany,
faced an Allied attack in the Dardanelles and a prospective
incursion by Russian forces on its eastern front. These
circumstances do not, however, justify its orders to deport some
two million Armenians from Eastern Turkey and its infliction upon
them of conditions which were calculated to, and did in fact, bring
about the destruction of a significant part of that group. HMG
condemned this action at the time as "a crime against humanity"
and promised that its perpetrators would be punished. But it was
not until 1948 that international law recognised the crime of
genocide. HMG has welcomed the recent establishment of
diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and the protocol
under which they have agreed to examine objectively these events,
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and hopes that the Turkish government will abolish section 301 of
its Penal Code, which would otherwise impede such examination.
HMG makes clear that should the same events occur today, in any
country with a similar history to that of Turkey in 1915, there can
be no doubt that the Genocide Convention would be engaged and
would require prosecutions for that crime as well as for crimes
against humanity.
I consider that parliament has been routinely misinformed by ministers
who have recited FCO briefs without questioning their accuracy. HMG's
real and only policy has been to evade truthful answers to questions about
the Armenian genocide because the truth would discomfort the Turkish
government. It can be predicted that any future question on the subject will
be met with the same meaningless formula about "insufficiently
unequivocal evidence," disguising the simple fact that HMG will not now
come to terms with an issue on which it was once so volubly certain,
namely, that the Armenian massacres were a "crime against humanity,"
which should never be forgiven or forgotten. Times change, but as other
civilised nations recognise, the universal crimes of genocide and torture
have no statute of limitations. Judge Balthazar Garzon, in opening his
investigation of the crimes of the Franco era, declared that their perpetrators
should have no posthumous impunity. The same might be said of the
authors of the Armenian genocide.
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